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In this paper we extend previous models of migration networks and ethnic cluster formation by 
considering migration as an ethnic-community wide phenomena where established migrants 
strategically provide support to newcomers. The incentive to provide support is associated with 
positive externalities which new waves of migrants might have on migrants already settled in the 
host location. Culturally-based tastes for particular goods and services generate an ethnic 
consumer demand and only individuals from the same ethnic community have the skills or the 
“insider’s information” required to provide these goods (protected market). If the ethnic population 
is large enough, an ethnic sector will emerge and eventually grow as the ethnic population expands 
further. 
According to the degree of preferences toward ethnic consumption, the mobility costs of the 
source locality population and congestion costs (hostility externalities) in the host location, 
alternative scenarios may arise. These scenarios provide a possible explanation of why different 










Keywords: Consumption externalities, immigration, ethnic cluster, ethnic goods. 
 
JEL classification: F22, J15, J61  
                                                 
✉  Address: Nicola D. Coniglio, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), 
Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, 5045 Norway.  





Several theoretical contributions have attempted to explain the geographical concentration of 
migrants from the same source region which is a frequently observed pattern of migration 
experiences. While a large set of potential destinations exist, migration is often only 
channelled into a very limited number where migrants networks are established already. 
Carrington et al. (1996) and Chau (1997) both provide a dynamic model of labour migration 
in which moving costs decrease with the number of established migrants in a particular 
destination. They show that once started, migration flows from the same source area 
accelerate even while inter-regional income gaps are reduced. In addition, in many empirical 
studies of migration, the stock of established migrants from the same area/country is almost 
always found to be a positive and significant explanatory variable. Moving costs are 
endogenous and decreasing in the size of past migration flows and subsequent waves of 
migration benefit from information and support provided by established migrants.
1  
While the passive aspect of this migration dynamic has been previously recognised in 
the literature, the active role of established migrants has been largely ignored. Why do 
established migrants give support to newcomers? Given the considerable amount of effort 
often involved in these actions of support, and given that support is not generally confined to 
family members but is often a community wide phenomenon, we have reason to believe that 
pure altruism is an important explanatory variable, but not the only one.
2  
In this paper we extend previous models of chain migration by considering migration 
as a community wide phenomenon where established migrants strategically provide support to 
newcomers. This active role of support provision is associated with positive externalities 
which new incoming migrants might have on migrants already settled in the host country. 
To the best of our knowledge, the work by Stark and Wang (2002) is the only one 
which deals with the same issue. In their model, support to newcomers in a particular location 
is provided only by highly skilled established migrants motivated not by altruistic 
                                                 
1 For empirical studies on migration networks which use micro-data level see Winters et al (2001), Munshi 
(2003), Chiswick and Miller (2002), Bauer et al (2002) 
2 Some recent contributions have emphasised the importance not only of “strong ties” such as households 
components or kin but also of “weak ties” as acquaintances and co-villagers. See Wilson (1998) on the 
importance of weak ties in Mexican migration networks in the US and Grannovetter (1973, 1982) on the 
importance of weak ties, in general, in locating employment opportunities. In their empirical study on Mexican   3
consideration but by pure self-interest. High-skilled migrants have an incentive to attract low-
skilled migrants since working with a larger number of these individuals renders their skills 
relatively more scarce (and therefore more valuable), which in turn has a positive effect on 
their wages. Their approach postulates the existence of a “migrants production function” 
where high and low-skilled migrants are jointly employed. Once in the host location, low-
skilled migrants become high skilled in the next period through an on-the-job skill 
enhancement process. In turn, they will provide support to a new wave of low skilled migrants 
giving rise to a migration chain.   In our opinion, their approach has some shortcomings. 
Firstly, it is not obvious why established low-skilled migrants would not use remittance 
strategically in order to keep potential new-comers at home (as in Stark 1999 or Docquier and 
Rapoport 1998). In addition, migration chain is a phenomena which takes place within 
components of the same source location community. A model which tries to explain 
migration chain on the basis of production externalities, as Stark and Wang 2002, would not a 
priori exclude the possibility to observe natives or high-skilled migrants giving support to 
low-skilled migrants belonging to different ethnic groups. For instance Indian and Chinese 
high-skilled workers giving support to Mexican low-skilled workers. Such a proposition is not 
empirically supported in migration studies. Furthermore, support by established migrants is 
not confined to high-skilled migrants providing help to low-skilled ones. Support appears to 
go beyond differences in skills. Supports it is often more pronounced between low-skilled 
migrants directly competing in the host locality labour market, as was the case for Italians and 
Irish immigrants in the US at the beginning of the last century. In a recent study on the 
contribution of Chinese and Indians scientists and engineers to the Silicon Valley economy, 
Saxenian (1999) documents the existence of dense ethnic networks within these highly skilled 
immigrants.
3  
In this paper, we view migration networks not merely as an aseptic instrument to 
facilitate immediate settlement of individual migrants but as the manifestation of a long-term 
development of a new community (or reconstruction of the lost one). A citation from a study 
on migration chains of Italians in Australia conducted by Lever-Tracy and Holton (2001) is 
emblematic of the main idea of this paper: 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
migration networks in the US, Winters et al (2001) are able to disentangle the relative effects of strong (family) 
and weak (community) ties on migration propensity and migrants’ location decision.  
3 Ethnic networks for these professionals are often institutionalised into professional associations. Virtually no 
overlap exists between different ethnic groups.  These organisations combine elements of traditional immigrants   4
“…He (an established migrant who helped many newcomers) just wanted as many Italians as 
possible in Australia…The more Italians came out the less foreign one would feel.” (page 94) 
 
We propose a model that explains both established migrants support to newcomers 
and the formation of ethnic communities on the basis of the existence of “ethnic consumption 
externalities”. Incoming migrants from the same ethnic community have an expansionistic 
effect on the number of ethnic-specific non-tradable goods and services available to 
established migrants in the host region. Culturally-based tastes for particular goods and 
services generate an ethnic consumer demand and only individuals from the same ethnic 
community have the skills or the “insider’s information” required to provide these goods 
(protected market). If the ethnic population is large enough, an ethnic sector will emerge and 
eventually grow as the population expands further. Migrant communities in almost every big 
city around the world provide a wide range of ethnic goods and services. Ethnic specific 
goods include for instance preparation of ethnic foods, banking and financial services, ethnic 
media such as magazines, radio, newspapers, religious services, organised unions, political 
groups and usually a vast array of migrant associations.  
As the size of the ethnic community grows larger and larger, discrimination in the 
labour market, prejudice and hostility from the larger society generate negative externalities 
which might offset any positive effect. For instance, during the Great Migration, African 
Americans in northern US cities became increasingly visible and as a consequence racist acts 
and violence against them increased. Congestion costs as the community expands might also 
be linked to the existence of a limited stock of housing or to increased competition in the 
labour market, compressing wages. 
The trade-off between these two opposing forces implies the existence of an optimal 
size of an ethnic community. In a recent contribution, Bauer et al. (2002) find evidence of an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between the number of Mexican migrants from the same 
village of origin to a particular US location and the probability that subsequent migrants from 
the same village will also choose that destination. Too many immigrants from the same 
village in a particular location decrease the probability of choosing that location. 
Although migration chains and the formation of ethnic communities characterise 
immigration and emigration experiences of many countries (both developed and LDCs) across 
all periods of human history, not all migration flows follow this pattern. Even more 
                                                                                                                                                         
culture and professional networking and exchange of information. They play a key role in supporting new 
immigrants in their professional and social adjustment in the US.   5
interesting is the fact that in this regard ethnic groups sometimes have different migratory 
behaviour.
4 In our model, according to the degree of preferences toward ethnic consumption, 
the mobility costs of the source country population and congestion costs (hostility 
externalities) in the host location, different scenarios arise. These scenarios provide a possible 
explanation for a variations in the observed migration dynamics of different ethnic 
communities.
5   
In section 2 we provide a brief review of recent empirical works on migration network. A 
discussion on the definition and nature of ethnic goods is presented in section 3. In section 4 
we outline the basic structure of the model and analyse the interaction between the preference 
for ethnic consumption and the size of the ethnic community in a given host location. We 
derive the conditions under which strategic support by established migrants is observed and 
the implications on the size of the ethnic community. In the same section alternative scenarios 
are outlined. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Migration networks, the role of established migrants and new immigrants’ location 
decision 
 
Established migrants often provide direct assistance to new migrants. They might help finance 
transportation costs, provide housing or pre-arrange jobs. In addition, established migrants in 
the network supply information, which allows recipients to assess more carefully the expected 
returns from migration. Nelson (1959) has classified information on which potential migrants 
form their expectations into two main categories: specific and generalised information. 
Specific information implies knowledge about particular opportunities, while generalised 
information concern the awareness about the attractiveness of opportunities in a location. 
Established migrants have a fundamental role in conveying both types of information. In 
particular, by providing specific information and direct assistance they considerably reduce 
migration costs for incoming migrants.  
                                                 
4 Ethnic concentration of migrants is not a phenomenon characterising only migration flows of low-skilled 
migrants from poor countries, as it is sometimes believed. For instance, a study by Glebe (1986) shows that the 
Japanese community in Dusseldorf is the most concentrated of all minorities in that city. White (1998) conducts 
a related study on the pattern of settlement of developed country migrants’ in London. Jews communities around 
the world represent another emblematic example of ethnic concentration mainly aimed at preserving the 
community identity and an ethnic social capital.  
5 For empirical evidence on the clustering patterns of immigrants by country of origin or ethnic group see 
Zavodny (1999) and Chiswick et al (2002) for the US and Australia respectively.   6
In his study of rural-to-urban migration in India, Banerjee (1984) finds that over one-
half of the migrants left their place of origin because of a suggestion to migrate received by 
contacts (relatives of friends) settled in the urban area. A considerable share of these migrants 
had a pre-arranged job or received assurances of urban employment before leaving the rural 
area. Menjivar (1995) shows that for newly arrived Mexican migrants in California it is 
common to be hosted by kin (relatives but also members of their hometown), borrow money 
and receive other important form of assistance from them. 
The availability of migration networks in certain host locations significantly affects 
individuals’ migration decision. The probability of migration to the US is higher for Mexican 
households with prior migration experience and for households originating from communities 
with extensive migration history (Massey and Garcia Espana, 1987).
6 
Migration networks, and the resulting exchange of information and support, are not 
only the result of “strong ties” such as those within household or kins but also of “weak ties” 
such as acquaintances and co-villagers.
7 In a recent article, Winters et al (2001) find strong 
support of the positive influence of migrants networks on (i) the decision to migrate; (ii) 
where to migrate and (iii) the number of migrants sent by a Mexican household. In their 
investigation, they are able to disentangle the separate effects on migration probability of 
strong (family) and weak (community) ties.  They find that family and community networks 
are substitutes in the generation of information and general assistance. Households with 
weaker family ties derive more benefit from community networks than households with larger 
family networks. 
Taylor (1986), in a model of household labour allocations under uncertainty 
emphasises the risk-reducing role of migration networks. Information, transmitted by 
established migrants, can improve the allocative efficiency of households’ labour decisions. In 
fact, their perception of the distribution of returns (subjective distribution) will match more 
accurately the true distribution (objective distribution). The value of accurate information is 
higher in the context of international migration, which is characterised by a high-risk 
environment, larger sunk costs (transportation, adjustment costs, psychical costs etc.) and 
scarcity of information. Migration networks are expected to have a greater role in 
international than in internal migration. Econometric analysis using data collected in two 
Mexican villages confirm the author’s model prediction. 
                                                 
6 On the consequences of migration networks in terms of labour market performance and immigrants 
adjustements see Munshi (2003), Chiswick and Miller (2002), Gonzales (1998), Borjas (1995).   7
An additional explanation to immigrants clustering is given by the existence of “herd 
behaviour” in migration. Epstein (2002) shows how potential migrants, who have some 
private information but are imperfectly informed about the attributes of alternative locations, 
might rationally decide to discount their private information and replicate the decision taken 
by previous migrants. In his model, individuals are able to observe previous emigrants’ 
decisions but not the information signal that was driving those decisions. Herd behaviour 
might result in inefficient equilibrium. Migrants may regret the choice taken and would have 
gained higher utility if they had not followed the herd and chosen a different destination. This 
theory based on “information cascades” between subsequent waves of migrants should not be 
considered as a completely different explanation for clustering. Herd behaviour and networks 
externalities might clearly coexist. In our opinion, information cascades in Epstein’s theory 
are equivalent to the notion of “generic information” flows as developed by Nelson (1959), to 
which we referred above. Generic information is often widespread without the active role or 
even the will of previous migrants. For instance, information about the locations chosen by 
people moving out of our village might be public knowledge. We might learn about it by 
talking with the butcher or barber of the village or sipping a coffee in the main square’s café. 
We can even form our suppositions on how successful a migrant is by looking, for instance, to 
his/her remittances at home (even if not directly observable, migrant’s riches can be assessed 
by observing consumption of remittances’ beneficiaries). This public knowledge about 
migrants’ economic performances in a given destination might certainly induce “herd 
behaviour” and therefore subsequent migration waves, which are not triggered by an active 
role of established migrants.  
Our model is based on different premises. The information cascade theory explains 
immigrants clustering on the basis of the existence of imperfect information in a framework 
were established migrants have no active role in “recruiting” newcomers. In our theory 
established migrants might play a very important role and their strategic decision whether to 
provide or not support to newcomers is linked to the interplay between positive ethnic 
consumption externalities and negative congestion costs.  We are able to depict a richer 
framework which explains not only the formation of ethnic concentration but also the 
development of an ethnic productive sector in a particular location. Production of a rich set of 
ethnic goods and services is a striking feature of the various Chinatown, Little Italy or Little 
Karachi around the world. 
                                                                                                                                                         
7 See Wilson (1998) on the importance of weak ties in Mexican migration networks in the US and Grannovetter 




3. On ethnic goods and services 
 
Consumption preference is one of the dimensions in which migrants often differ more from 
the native population in the host locality.  Immigrants from a particular ethnic group might 
have distinctive preferences toward a set of consumption varieties (which we define “ethnic 
goods and services”), not shared with the host population. Distinctiveness in consumption is 
particularly strong for ethnic migrants coming from source communities whose components 
share a strong cultural identity. Ethnic varieties are broadly defined to include both market 
and non-market goods and services. In the last category will fall, for instance, social 
interactions between member of the same community of origin as normal gatherings and  
celebration of certain specific religious festivals. The ethnic identity of these goods is linked 
to the fact that they address needs specific to the individual belonging to the ethnic 
community.  In the consumption bundle of immigrants, ethnic goods and services might be of 
considerable importance. As a consequence, availability and prices of these goods in the host 
location might play an important role in shaping the location decision of ethnic migrants.  
In order to understand how ethnic consumption might affect immigrants’ location 
decisions and the migration dynamics of an ethnic community, it is important to define first, 
the nature of ethnic commodities.  
Some of these goods are tradable. Ethnic dress, particular ingredients essential for 
preparing ethnic meals, CDs of Italian, Norwegian or Pakistani singers and DVDs of Tibetan 
or Chinese movies might all be traded over long distances. Availability of these tradable 
goods in principle, is identical across potential localities in the host destination. Prices at 
different locations are however unlikely to be identical. Firstly, transportation costs might 
differ. Although for a single commodity transport costs might not be highly significative, the 
sum of  these costs across the entire bundle of ethnic consumption might be considerable. If 
potential destinations are in different countries, duties and import taxes levied by national 
authorities, might contribute to price disparities. Secondly, and probably more significant, a 
certain amount of fixed costs are associated with the distribution of ethnic goods. Setting up a 
distribution channel is costly. As a consequence, the equilibrium price of an ethnic variety 
will be higher in locations with a smaller number of ethnic consumers. In addition, localities 
with a small number of ethnic consumers are likely to have only one or a limited number of   9
suppliers/retailers of a particular product. The lack of competition in the retailing sector is 
likely to translate into higher prices. For example, if parmisan cheese is sold only in one shop 
in town, the shopkeeper will be able to extract greater surplus by acting as a local monopoly 
than if competition was fierce. In summary, for the reasons outlined above, the price of a 
given bundle of consumption of tradable ethnic commodities might be decreasing in the size 
of the ethnic community in the host location. 
A considerable share of ethnic goods and services are non-tradable. Demand for a 
type of religious service or the service of a doctor applying traditional chinese medicine both 
fall into this category. When the degree of social and cultural distance between the ethnic 
group and the host population is high, goods and services which are not per se ethnic might be 
considered so, in virtue of the fact that they are provided by members of the same ethnic 
group of the consumer. For example the service offered by a lawyer appear in general to not 
have a distinctive ethnic component. Nevertheless, for a Mexican whether the lawyer is 
Mexican or not may be an important factor in their decision who to hire. The Mexican 
customer might have “special consumer demands” that a lawyer with an insider knowledge of 
the ethnic’s group culture may be able to provide more effectively. Consequently, even if the 
price charged and the final results of the service are identical, the Mexican customer will 
probably find himself more at ease with a member of his own community and hence more 
likely to use their services. Non-pecuniary transaction costs in the trade between the lawyer 
and his client, such as language barriers, might be considerably reduced when these 
individuals belong to the same community of origin. The number of ethnic non-tradable 
varieties available in a particular host location is largely dependent on the intensity of 
preferences for ethnic consumption and on the size of the ethnic group. If the group is 
sufficiently large, it may support the existence in the host location of a differentiated set of 
ethnic varieties. In many large cities across the world, immigration transforms some 
neighbourhoods into a replica of the town or community of the source country.
8 
If ethnic consumption has a high value, a migrant will prefer, ceteris paribus, a 
location which offers a wide selection of ethnic goods at a lower price, i.e. a location with a 
large concentration of migrants from the same ethnic community.  
Given the intrinsic nature of ethnic commodities, individuals belonging to the same ethnic 
group as the consumers are best suited at producing them. In practice, insider’s knowledge of 
the ethnic community’s culture is essential in providing goods and services closer to 
                                                 
8 For an interesting sociological study on Hungarian immigrants in North America and their pattern of 
location/ethnic consumption during the first half of 20
th century see Kosa (1956).   10
consumer tastes. Ethnic producers tend to have to a certain extent a protected market, i.e. a 
competitive edge over non-ethnic producers. In some cases, for certain goods and services, 
the market can be completely isolated and ethnic producers are not only more able then others 
to satisfy demand but are in fact the only ones who can actually supply the ethnic market. An 
emblematic example, illustrated by Boyd (1998), is that of religious services demanded by 
African-American immigrants from the American South in urban northern areas during the 
Great Black Migration in the US. What was “ethnic” about these religious services?  African 
Americans “were accustomed to services accompanied by improvisational singing, shouting 
and other form of active participation and demonstrative enthusiasm”. Pioneer migrants were 
dissatisfied with “intellectual sermons” and cold and impersonal large congregations they 
found in the northern cities (Grossman, 1989). Large flows of southern migrants created the 
demand for churches and therefore, pastors travelling northward, who were better able to 
accommodate their special tastes. 
From the above discussion it is clear that the number of both tradable and non-tradable 
varieties is highly likely to be positively affected by the size of the ethnic group in the host 
location. In what follows, we capture this idea in the simplest possible way by considering the 
existence of non-tradable varieties only.   
 
4. The  model 
 
In order to analyse the relationship between individuals’ migration decisions, migration 
chains and preferences for non-tradable ethnic goods and services, we specify a simple model 
representing a single potential destination. This section is divided into three parts. In the first 
part the migration behaviour and consumption preferences are presented. The production 
structure of the economy is specified in the second part, while in the last part, migration 
pattern and the optimal size of the ethnic group are analysed.   
  
 
4.1 Migrant’s utility 
 
Migrant’s utility is defined over two types of goods and services, ethnic (E) and native (Y). In 
line with our discussion above, we assume that, production of ethnic goods requires the 
employment of individuals of the same ethnic group as the consumers (i.e. the same source 
location).  We assume that the goods and services are non-tradable, this means that the   11
number of ethnic varieties available depends on the size of the ethnic group in a given 
locality. 
Native goods are purely labour intensive (i.e. labour is the only input), where the 
labour pool consists of both migrants and natives. The two types of goods in the economy are 
produced in many differentiated varieties. We define  E n and  Y n  as the number of respectively 
type E and type Y goods. 
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where  0 ε >  indicates that ethnic migrants particularly enjoy consumption of ethnic varieties. 
This formulation of the utility function implies that ethnic and non-ethnic goods and services 
are substitutes. Ethnic producers have “insider information” and particular skills which enable 
them to provide products closer to the taste and needs of ethnic consumers. As highlighted 
above, this might include the cooking of a particular meal, provision of religious services or 
simply the ordering and display of goods the way it is done in the source country. The 
parameter  () 0,1 θ ∈  captures the intensity for the love-of-variety in the utility function; as 
θ → 0, consumers derive more utility from product variety and as θ →1, they derive less 
utility from product variety.   Ei c  and  Yj c  represent respectively consumption of good i, j of 
type E and Y. The last term on the right-hand-side ( M ξ ) captures the fact that as the size of 
the ethnic group in one location increases (M), i.e. as the ethnic community becomes more 
“visible”, migrants suffer from hostility and/or discrimination inflicted upon them by native 
inhabitants. For simplicity we assume a linear “hostility externality” measured by  0 ξ ≥  times 
the size of the ethnic group M .
10 More generally, the hostility externality captures congestion 
costs of different nature associated with a dimensional expansion of the ethnic community. 
We assume that each migrant is endowed with one unit of labour which is inelastically 
supplied in the individual’s location of residence. The budget constrain of a representative 
migrant is given by: 
 
                                                 
9 In what follows we use a modelling strategy for the migrants’ preferences similar to that employed by Glazer et 
al. (2003) in a different context.   12
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From equations  (1) and (2) we obtain the following migrant’s demand for a single E and Y 
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where 
/(1 ) '( 1 / ( 1 ) )
θ θ εε
− =+ . Conversely, native individuals’ demand for a single native variety 
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4.2 Production technology 
 
The two sectors of our economy have the same production technology. The only difference 
consists of the fact that the ethnic sector employs a specific factor of production, ‘ethnic 
labour’. Since all varieties, both of type E and type Y, are symmetric in what follows we 
consider production of a representative firm irrespective of the type of products. Each variety 
is produced at decreasing average costs. An initial effort (fixed costs) is needed to set up a 
new business, and then each unit is produced at constant marginal cost. The labour input 
requirement for each variety is given by: 
 
ii lx α β =+               ( 5 )  
                                                                                                                                                          
10 For an interesting theoretical discussion concerning the “hostility externality” suffered by minority groups see   13
 
where , α β   are respectively the fixed and the variable costs and  i x  is the output level of the 
differentiated good or service. Love of variety and increasing returns at the firm level imply 
that each newcomer in the non-tradable sector will produce a new variety in order to capture 
some ‘monopolistic power’. 
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As long as excess profits exist, firms will continue to enter the market until profits are driven 
to zero, that is  () 0 ii i i px x w πα β =− + = . It follows that in equilibrium the optimal quantity 
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4.3 Size of the ethnic group and number of ethnic varieties 
 
Migrants can be employed in either Y  or E  sectors. In addition, they can move freely 
between sectors, equalising wages in equilibrium. The number of ethnic and native varieties 
produced in equilibrium is demand driven (given by the share of income spent on ethnic and 
native goods and services).  
When will an ethnic sector emerge? The first ethnic variety will be produced in the host 
location only if there is sufficient demand for it. In other words, migrants demand ( E Mc ) is 
sufficiently large to cover the break-even optimal quantity 
*
E x  as defined by eq. (7). If this 
                                                                                                                                                          
Carlton (1995). Another interesting reading on hostility and the size of a minority is Rapoport and Weiss (2003).   14
condition is not satisfied, i.e. the size of the migrants community is below a critical mass, 
migrants will be employed in the production of native varieties and consume only native 
products. In this case, migrants will have the following utility and their individual demand 
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Equilibrium implies that goods and labour markets clear, that is, demand equals 
supply for any variety and all individuals are employed. When only the production of native 
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where , M L  represent the size of the ethnic and native populations. By replacing eq. (6) into 
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In a similar fashion, when the size of the ethnic community is large enough to sustain an 
ethnic productive sector, the equilibrium conditions in the goods markets for a representative 
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where we assume that natives’ consumption of ethnic variety is equal to zero. 
















































An ethnic productive sector will emerge ( 0 E n > ) if and only if the following condition is 
satisfied: 
 
Condition 1: An ethnic sector exists if and only if the share of migrants from the same ethnic 
community with respect to the native population ( / M L) is larger than  () '/ 1 ' ε ε − . 
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where 
/(1 ) '( 1 / ( 1 ) )
θ θ εε
− =+ . For a given level of the native population (L), the stronger 
migrants’ preference toward ethnic variety vis-à-vis native ones (ε →large), the lower the 
critical mass of the migrants’ community for which an ethnic sector arises. In addition, the 
lower the intensity of the love-for-variety ( 1 θ → ), the lower will be  j M . The intuition behind 
this last result follows from the fact that the higher θ , the lower the gain in utility due to 
diversification of consumption. As a consequence, the ethnic migrant will shift expenditure 
toward consumption of the goods which provide him or her with the highest level of utility, 
i.e. ethnic varieties. 
 
Proof: Ethnic and native variety use the same technology, i.e. the same labour input 
requirement 
*
i l . Given the amount of total labour available in the host location economy 
() M L + , the following relationship holds:  ( )
_* /
no ethnic
YY E i nn n M L l =+= + . As long as 
migrants in the host location will find more profitable to demand only native variety no ethnic 
goods will be produced (
_ no ethnic VV > ). Only when the marginal utility from having an ethnic 
variety is equal to that of having an extra native one the ethnic production will start. The 
critical mass of migrants necessary to sustain an ethnic productive sector is found by solving 
the following equality 
_ no ethnic VV = . Using eqs. (1), (9), (11) and (13) and solving for M, we 
obtain  eq. (14). (see appendix II) g 
 
 
4.4 The pattern of migration and the optimal size of the ethnic group 
 
4.4.1 The autonomous wave of migrants 
 
All workers in the source location have the same level of skills and inelastically supply one 
unit of labour for which they are paid a wage rate ( s w ), which is only a fraction of the wage 
offered in the host location ( h w ). However, migration is costly. In the source location, each 
individual j in the population (P ) faces a mobility cost  j a , which is broadly defined to 
include the full cost of relocating in the new destination such as psychological costs, travel 
expenditure and the considerable amount of information required in order to take the decision 
to migrate. Individuals face different mobility costs, which we assume to be continuously   17
distributed on the interval,  , j aa a  ∈ , where a and a identify the most mobile and more 
immobile individual in the population respectively.
11 The fraction of population in the source 




Fa faP d a = ∫ , where 
() f a  is the probability density function for any particular level of migration cost a. ( ) Fa is, 
therefore, the cumulative distribution function and is strictly positive, increasing and 
differentiable.  
A very simple and tractable case, which we will use in the following analysis, is when 
mobility costs are uniformly distributed, that is  ()1 / j f aa a   = −   for any  , j aa a  ∈ . 
On the basis of available information on potential destinations, an individual will move 
toward the destination (if any) which maximises his/her utility net of migration costs. The first 
individual (or group of individuals) will migrate if utility in the host location net of migration 
costs is higher than utility at home. Formally, if   hs j VVa − >  individual j will migrate, where 
h V and  s V  are indirect utility levels in the host and source destinations respectively. Without 
loss of generality and only for analytical convenience, we assume that the availability of 
ethnic varieties in the source location is fixed at a given level and migration is relatively small 
so that it does not have any detrimental effect on the number of varieties produced at home. 
This implies that we can treat the utility associated with the source locality as fixed at a 
constant level  s V .
12 
In our simple two locations model, the initial autonomous flow of migrants’ ( 1 M ) 
depends on the utility differential (explained by both the exogenous wage rate differential and 
the endogenous availability/composition of non-tradable varieties) and the distribution among 
the population of ‘mobility costs’ in the source location.
13 
For a given set of expected host/source utility levels, the marginal migrant of the initial 
migration flow ( 1 M ), which is indifferent between migrating or staying at home has the 
following mobility cost: 
                                                 
11 These captures the fact that some individuals are more mobile than others for factors such as personal and 
household characteristics (age, gender, homeowners etc.), the degree of involvement in community life in the 
origin region and exogenously given preferences over the home location. 
12 We acknowledge that migration flows sometimes might have detrimental effects on the source economy. That 
is particularly true if migration is highly selective towards more skilled individuals, as is often the case. In our 
model we rule out this consideration since we are exclusively interested in investigating the dynamics of 
migration flows rather than the consequences thereof on those left behind in the source location.   18
 
() 11 hs aV M V =−            ( 1 5 )  
 






M faP d a =∫            ( 1 6 )  
 
 
A corner solution with no migration (complete de-population) arises when equation (15) is 
never satisfied and  () jh s aV MV >−  ( ( ) jh s aV MV < − ) for any  , j aa a   ∈  .  In what follows 
we concentrate our attention on the pattern of migration in the case of an internal solution, 
1 0 M P << , i.e. a positive and finite initial flow of migrants. 
Since ethnic goods are initially not available in the host destination, a relatively large 
wage gap could be necessary to kick-start migration. The most mobile individuals of the 
source location (if migration takes place) will compose the first wave of migrants.  
Equation (16) measures the size of the ethnic community in the host locality without 
strategic support from established migrants to potential incoming migrants. 
In what follows, we analyse the effect of incoming migrants from the same source 
community on the utility of established migrants. In addition, we show how the active role of 
established migrants in supporting newcomers enables us to depict a rich set of possible 
scenarios in terms of patterns of migration and ethnic community size in the host locality. 
 
 
4.4.2 The effect of newcomers on established migrants’ utility and the optimal size of the 
ethnic community 
 
Once in the new location, established migrants have an incentive to give support to 
newcomers only if new migrants have a positive effect on their utility. Potential gains from 
incoming migration in terms of utility are endogenous and depend on the size of the resulting 
ethnic community in the host location. In the context of our model, different scenarios may 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 While the setting of our model is fundamentally static, its interpretation is implicitly dynamic as it is   19
emerge according to the size of the initial, autonomous wave of migrants ( 1 M ), the degree of 
migrants’ preferences toward the ethnic goods and services (ε ), and the reaction of natives to 
increasing immigration flows (hostility externality,  M ξ ). 
Ethnic varieties will be available in the host localities only if condition 1 is satisfied, 
that is a critical mass  j M  of ethnic migrants is already settled in the host locality. The effects 
of incoming migrants will therefore differ according to the existence (or not) of an ethnic 
productive sector. Two cases emerge. 
  
Case 1. No ethnic productive sector (size of the initial pool of migrants  j
1 M M ≥ ) 
 
If the size of the initial ethnic community is smaller than the critical mass needed to establish 
an ethnic sector, migrants will initially consume only native non-tradable goods and services. 











−  −  =+ −  
 
        ( 1 7 )  
 
From the above equation it follows that the effect of further immigration on the utility of the 
established migrants depends on the trade-off between the positive native variety expansion 
effect and the negative effect due to increasing ethnic discrimination/congestion costs.  
The optimal size of the migrant community is reached when the two opposite effects 
are balanced, i.e.  /0 VM ∂∂= . We call this threshold level 
** M , which is given by the 









− − −− 
=− − 

         ( 1 8 )  
 
This size of the ethnic community is realised when only all individuals with mobility cost 
**
j aa a <≤find it convenient to migrate, where 




a M faP d a =∫  
                                                                                                                                                          
frequently the case in the economic literature aimed at analysing the spatial structure of the economy.   20
 
Case 2. Ethnic productive sector (size of the initial pool of migrants  j
1 M M > ) 
 
When the size of the community is larger than or equal to  j M , an ethnic productive sector is 












−  + −  =−  
 
        ( 1 9 )  
 
 
Also in this situation a trade-off associated with subsequent immigration exists. The only 
difference is in the nature of the positive externality, which in this second case is due to an 
ethnic variety expansion effect. 
Also for this case, in which the initial autonomous flow of migrants is above  j M , we 







θ θ θ θε
θ αξ
β
− − −−  +
=− 

         ( 2 0 )  
  
We define 
* a  as the level of mobility cost associated with  ()
*
* a
a M faP d a =∫ . 
The optimal size of the ethnic community in Case 1 is always smaller than in Case 2, 
i.e. 
** * M M <  (see Appendix III). 
Figure 1 depicts the level of utility that migrants enjoy in the host location (net of the 
constant level enjoyed in the source country  hs h s VV V − = − ) as a function of the ethnic 
community size. When the ethnic community in the host location has a size below (above) the 
threshold size  j M , 
** *
hh VV >  (
** *
hh VV < ). Migrants’ utility is given by eq. (19) when  j M M ≥ , 
and by eq. (17) when  j M M ≤ . Three different cases are shown. Diagram (a) represents the 
situation in which  j ** * M MM < < . This case is characterised by relatively strong preferences 
for ethnic products, a low degree of love for variety and/or low hostility externalities. The   21




a M faP d a =∫ ), has a 
mobility cost lower than 
** a . An intermediate case, where  j ** * M MM < < , is reported in 
diagram  (b), while diagram (c) represents a case opposite to the first one where 
j ** * M MM << .  
The upward sloping line in the diagrams,  ( ) CP, represents mobility costs across the 
population in the source locality when these are uniformly distributed. The relevant equation 
in this simple and tractable case is: 
 
() () / CP a P a a =+ −            ( 2 1 )  
 
where the intercept a is the mobility cost of the most mobile individual in the source region 
and the slope might be interpreted, for a given population P in the source locality, as a 
measure of mobility costs dispersion.  
The relationships between  j M  and the two optimal sizes, 
* M and 
** M , defined above 
are important in understanding the alternative scenarios depicted by our model which are 
investigated in the next section. In table 1, we report the sign of the derivatives of  j M , 
* M  
and 
** M  with respect to the main variables of the model. 
 
Table 1. The effects of model’s parameters and variables on  j M , 
* M  and 



























j M  
 
−  −  0  0  0  0 
* M  
 
+  + / − *  −  −  −  0 
** M  
 
0  + / − *  −  −  −  − 
* = both signs according to the size of other parameters    22
 
As already mentioned in section 4.3, the threshold level  j M  is decreasing in the 
intensity of preferences toward ethnic consumption vis-à-vis native consumption (ε ) and is 
increasing in intensity of love for variety. The optimal size of the ethnic group when an ethnic 
sector already exists is increasing in ε . More migrants in the host localities expand the set of 
ethnic variety available to the whole ethnic community. When preferences for these goods are 
strong, this positive effect will dominate the negative effects over a larger size of the 
community. On the other hand, 
* M  is decreasing in congestion costs (ξ ) and in labour costs 
of production ( , α β ). More ambiguous are the signs of both 
* / M θ ∂ ∂  and 
** / M θ ∂∂ , which 
depend jointly on the size of other parameters in a non-linear way. 
Note that an increase in the native population L, has a negative impact on 
** M . This 
result is obvious from eq. (18) and is due to the fact that the bigger the native population, the 
higher is the number of varieties already available in the host locality. Therefore, the positive 
native expansion effect associated with incoming migrants could be more than offset by 
negative externalities. When negative externalities are particularly strong, both 
* M  and 
** M  
might be negative, which means that the optimal size of the ethnic community is zero. 
In figure 2,  j M , 
* M  and 
** M  are plotted against ε  keeping all other parameters fixed 
at a certain level. When preferences toward type E goods are only marginally higher than 
those for native varieties (in the figure: 0 A ε < < ),  j M  is bigger than 
* M  and 
** M . This 
situation corresponds to diagram (c) in figure 1. Stronger ethnic preferences will lead to the 
alternative two cases depicted in figure 1. 
 
 
4.4.3 Strategic support and the size of the ethnic community: alternative scenarios 
 
After having outlined the general framework of our analysis, in this section we define the 
migration pattern under alternative scenarios. The main questions we want to address are the 
following: 
(i)  When will established migrants provide support to newcomers?  
(ii)  What is the resulting size of an ethnic group?  
(iii)  Is the resulting size equal to the optimal size? 
(iv)  When does an ethnic productive sector arise? 
   23
The set of possible scenarios predicted by the model is reported in table 2. In what follows we 
define the conditions under which each scenario arises and describe the underlying migration 
pattern. 
 
By giving support to potential newcomers, whether sending them information on job 
opportunities in the host location or giving direct support in order to reduce initial difficulties 
and uncertainty, established migrants influence the size of the flows.
14 Therefore, if positive 
externalities arise as a consequence of a larger size of the ethnic community in the host 
location, established migrants might strategically use ‘support’ as a way of internalising those 
externalities.  
 
Definition 1: The utility gain (or loss) experienced by a community of established migrants of 
size  k M  as the ethnic community expands up to a size Mj is given by 
( ) () (,) kj k h s j h sk GM M M V M V M −−  =−   ;
 15 
 
Proposition 1: For a given size of the ethnic community already in the host location,  K M , 




k M M < , i.e. the size of the ethnic community is initially smaller than the optimal size 
* M ; 
 
Proof:  If the above condition is not satisfied and 
*
k M M ≥ , established migrants’ utility is 
decreasing in M since  / 0 h VM ∂∂ ≤  for any 
*, M MP   ∈ . It follows that  () ,0 kJ GM M < . 
Migrants already settled in the host locality experience a utility loss as a consequence of 




k M M < , there exists a  ( )





Kj h s MM GM M CMd M V Md M − >− ≥ ∫∫ ; i.e. the gain experienced by established 
migrants in terms of consumption externalities is larger than the support needed by a number 
                                                 
14 And in a multi-location framework the direction of the flows.   24
of incoming migrants of size () jk M M − in order to be indifferent between migrating or 
remaining in the home location. 
 
The total optimal support 






hs MM S CMd M V Md M
++
− =− ∫∫        ( 2 2 )  
 
where  1 K M +  is the size of the ethnic community after the new migrants triggered by the 
support are settled in the host location. At  1 k M + , the marginal gain of having a new migrant is 
equal to the marginal support that would be necessary to induce him/her to migrate: 
 
  () () ( ) 11 1 , Kh s k kK CM V M GM M
MM





Before we proceed with depicting the different scenarios reported in table 2, it is 
convenient to define the equilibrium size of the ethnic community as follows:  
 
Definition 2:  The size of an ethnic community in the host location reaches a stable 
equilibrium (
E M ) when:  
(i)  () () ( ) //
EE E
hs GM M CM V M M −  ∂∂ ≤ ∂− ∂  or  ( )/0
E GM M ∂ ∂≤ ; 
(ii)  for any individual with mobility cost  ( ) ,
E
j aa a ∈ , where  ()
E a E
a M faP d a =∫ , the cost 
of migrating is larger than the associated net gain in utility, formally 
()() () () jj h sj j CM a V M a − > . 
 
The interpretation of this definition is straightforward. A stable equilibrium, 
E M , is achieved 
at a point in which established migrants have no incentive to further support incoming 
migrants and all individuals left behind in the source location have no incentive to migrate 
due to their high mobility costs. Condition (i) is necessary but not sufficient. A new group of 
                                                                                                                                                          
15 For the autonomous initial “mass” of migrants,  1 K M M =  as defined by equation (16).   25
individuals in the source location might find it profitable to migrate without support since the 
ethnic community has expanded to a level which more than compensates for their mobility 
costs.
16  
For the community strategic support to be effective, we must assume that established 
migrants act like a ‘cohesive group’ and are able to control and prevent free riding behaviour 
within the group so that all components contribute to the supportive action. In general ethnic 
minorities show a high degree of co-operation and mutual support, which probably is due to 
their ability to sanction opportunistic behaviour and enforce trust. For instance, it is frequently 
observed that informal financing within an ethnic minority is often a common way of 
obtaining credit. As emphasised by the literature, informal financing is usually the preferred 
option within communities where monitoring is more intense, costs of information about a 
debtor are very low and enforcement mechanisms are more effective.  
Established migrants’ support is fundamental in expanding the host locality ethnic 
community through subsequent induced migration flows. Their effort might lead to the 
formation of an ethnic productive sector.  
Figure 3,  scenario 1, illustrates the theoretical case characterised by (i)  established 
migrants support to newcomers, (ii) the emergence of an ethnic productive sector and  (iii) an 
equilibrium size of the ethnic community equal to the optimal size 
* E M M = . Individuals 
composing the initial pool of migrants,  1 M , have an incentive to support newcomers since in 
doing so they might achieve a higher level of utility for themselves. The optimal amount of 
support provided is given by the total area between  ( ) CM and  ( ) hs VM −  as defined by eq. 
(22). As reported in table 2, this scenario is likely to arise when: 
a)  Migrants in the source locality have very strong preferences for ethnic goods and services 
vis-à-vis native ones. In this situation, the critical mass of migrants necessary to set up an 
ethnic sector is small. This is often the case for ethnic migrants with cultural, religious and 
social preferences very dissimilar from those of the host country. The migration cost in 
this case is generally higher since immigrants find it more difficult to assimilate into the 
mainstream society, and individuals will be willing to pay more in order to recreate the 
                                                 
16 This will happen when the size of the ethnic community in the host destination is still lower than the optimal 
size (
*
K M M <  ) and therefore utility of established and incoming migrants is increasing in the size of the 
community,  /0 hs VM − ∂∂ > . The migrants triggered by support (induced migrants) are followed by a new 
flow of autonomous migrants composed by individuals who previously had incentive to stay put. As a 
consequence of the expansion of the ethnic community, and therefore the availability of more ethnic varieties, 
these individuals subsequently found it profitable to migrate even without support from established migrants.   26
source country environment. A native language different from that of the host country will 
work in the same direction (see Bauer et al. 2002). 
b)  Mobility costs of potential incoming migrants are not prohibitively high (but neither too 
small, see scenario 2). The support necessary to induce incoming migrants to join the 
“ethnic club” in the host location should not be too large. Established migrants’ support, 
in this case, will be positive until the ethnic community reaches the optimal size 
* E M M = . Above this size no support will be provided since, 
* () / 0 GM M ∂ ∂< , i.e. 
expansion of the community above this threshold will have detrimental effect on 
established migrants’ utility since the hostility externality dominates the positive 
consumption externality. 
c)  Hostility externalities or congestion costs are low. 
 
The optimal size of the community will differ from the optimal one in scenario 2 
(established migrants support newcomers, an ethnic productive sector is set up and the ethnic 
community size is 
* E M M ≠ ) under two circumstances. Firstly, when mobility costs for those 
left behind in the source population are high (i.e.  ( ) CM is steep). In this circumstance, 
established migrants find it profitable to support up to a level where the marginal gain of 
having an extra migrant is equal to its marginal cost. The resulting equilibrium size of the 
community is smaller than the optimal, 
* E M M < . Secondly, the equilibrium size will differ 
from the optimal size also in the case of low mobility costs in the population (i.e.  () CM is 
flat). This case is depicted in figure 3. The ethnic variety expansion effect, caused by the 
settlement of new migrants, will exert an attraction force also for other individuals in the host 
location who, therefore, benefit indirectly from established migrants’ support. Joining the 
“migration club” becomes profitable also for them.
17  
For weak preferences toward the ethnic goods and relatively low hostility externalities, the 
likely outcomes are those represented in figure 4 (scenarios 3 and 4). an ethnic productive 
sector is not set up in any of the cases but we still observe support by established migrants to 
newcomers. Equilibrium size of the ethnic community is 
** E M M =  in scenario 3 and 
** E M M ≠  in scenario 4. 
                                                 
17 A strategic use of remittances in the source location might in principle prevent further migration and act as a 
means of achieving the optimal size. Even by including strategic remittances in the analysis, scenario (2) is still 
a possible outcome for very low mobility costs since the strategic remittances required to induce individuals to 
stay put might be too large for 
* E M M = to be a feasible equilibrium.    27
When preferences for ethnic consumption are strong but mobility costs in the source 
locality are rather low, the likely outcome is depicted in figure 5 (scenario 5). Migrants have 
a strong preference for ethnic consumption and therefore an ethnic sector is likely to emerge. 
Established migrants have no incentive to support newcomers, and the mobility cost curve 
() CM cuts the utility curve  ( ) hs VM −  in a point where negative externalities dominate 
positive ones.  
Finally, no support and no ethnic productive sector will characterise the migratory 
experience in the presence of relatively low preferences for ethnic goods associated with 
strong congestion costs when migration costs are low (figure 5, scenario 6). In these last two 
scenarios, the equilibrium size of the ethnic community is equal to the size of the initial 
autonomous flow of migrants  1
E M M = . 
 
 
5. Concluding  remarks 
 
In this paper we provide a theory of migration network and ethnic cluster formation based on 
the existence of migrants’ preferences toward ethnic non-tradable goods and services which 
only individuals belonging to the same ethnic community can provide. In our model, 
established migrants play a key role in determining the migratory experience of the ethnic 
community through the strategic use of support to reduce mobility costs of subsequent   
migrants. The model is able to produce a rich set of scenarios, which we argue are in line with 
the heterogeneous migration dynamics showed by different ethnic groups.  
The more different the cultural, political and economic environment the region of 
origin is from that of the region of destination, the higher the probability that ethnic migrants 
will cluster together in a selected number of communities. In addition, the larger will be the 
resulting size of the ethnic minority since established migrants will be willing to devote more 
effort to support newcomers in order to recreate, at least in part, the economic, religious and 
cultural environment they left behind at home.  
Incoming migrants expand the set of ethnic non-tradable varieties which are produced 
in the host locality. This effect is undoubtedly positive on migrants already settled in the 
ethnic cluster. Nevertheless, migrants compete over scarce resources such as housing and job 
opportunities. In addition, as human history shows, as ethnic minority expands in the host 
destination the probability of hostile and discriminatory behaviour toward them from the   28
native population increases as well. In our model we show that coexistence of these positive 
and negative externalities determines an “optimal size” of the ethnic community. The actual 
size of the community may well be different from the optimal size. 
The model’s predictions match some important findings observed in empirical studies. 
When a group of migrants has similar preferences to those of the native population in the host 
country, our model predicts more dispersed migration flows which are mainly driven by 
regional differences in economic fundamentals (real wages, unemployment rate etc.). This 
should be the case for internal migration which involves individuals characterised by 
relatively homogeneous preferences.  In this regard, the model is in line with the different 
geographical patterns of internal versus international migration flows frequently found in 
empirical studies. Immigrants are generally more geographically concentrated than natives 
and reside in cities with a large population of the same ethnic group (see for instance Bartel 
1989).  
Often ethnic clusters tend to die with the ageing of the first generation of established 
migrants. On the basis of the premises of our model this phenomenon could be explained by 
decreasing attachment to “ethnic consumption” and increasing assimilation into native society 
by descendants of those individuals. 
Interesting extensions of the model and alternative formulation are possible. First, it 
would be interesting to extend the model by considering a multi-location framework. The 
advantage would be one of analysing not only the size of the ethnic community but also the 
direction of migration in a richer set. Once a “migration club” has eroded its attractiveness, 
new destinations might emerge and the migratory dynamic is replicated in the new 
destination. Second, considering more explicitly the welfare of native population and 
endogenising the congestion/hostility externalities can considerably enrich the migration 
dynamic described above.   29
Table 2 – Migration dynamics: features of alternative scenarios 
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   Strong preferences for 
ethnic goods and service 
( high ε → ); 
   Large dispersion of 
mobility costs in the 
source location 
population. (slope of 
( ) CM, i.e. 
( ) 1/ aa −→ relatively 
small); 
   Low hostility 




   Strong preferences for 
ethnic goods and service 
( high ε → ); 
   Very large (very small) 
dispersion of mobility 
costs in the source 
location population 
(slope of  ( ) CM, i.e. 
( ) 1/ aa − → either very 
large or very small); 
   Low hostility 







   Strong preferences for 
ethnic goods and 
service ( high ε → ); 
   Small dispersion of 
mobility costs in the 
source location 
population (slope of 
( ) CM, i.e. 
( ) 1/ aa −→ large); 
   High hostility 
externalities 
( low ξ → ). 
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   Weak preferences for 
ethnic goods and service 
( 0 ε → ); 
   Large dispersion of 
mobility costs in the 
source location 
population. (slope of 
( ) CM, i.e. 
( ) 1/ aa −→ relatively 
small); 
   Low hostility 




   Weak preferences for 
ethnic goods and service 
( 0 ε → ); 
   Very large (very small) 
dispersion of mobility 
cost in the source 
location population 
(slope of  ( ) CM, i.e. 
( ) 1/ aa − → either very 
large or very small); 
   Low hostility 





   Weak preferences for 
ethnic goods and 
service ( 0 ε → ); 
   Small dispersion of 
mobility costs in the 
source location 
population (slope of 
( ) CM, i.e. 
( ) 1/ aa −→ large); 
   High hostility 
externalities 
( low ξ → ). 
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Appendix I:  
 
In the destination location, given a certain wage level (w), the migrant maximises utility (1) 
subject to the budget constraint (2), we set up the Lagrangian: 
 
00 0 0
((1 ) ) ((1 ) )
EY E E nn n n
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    ∫∫ ∫ ∫    (A.1) 
 
the F.O.Cs. for (A.1) are the following: 
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       ( A . 1 . 4 )  
 
Given that E and Y varieties are produced using the same IRS technology,  Ei Yj p p =  and 
defining as in Glazer et al (2003) 
/(1 ) '( 1 / ( 1 ) )
θ θ εε
− =+ , from (A.1.4) it follows: 
 
' Yj Ei cc ε =              ( A . 1 . 5 )  
 
It is worth noting that 0' 1 ε ≤≤ , therefore eq. (A.1.5) indicates that the amount consumed of a 
Y good is only a fraction of that of an E good; this is obvious given that migrants attach more 
value to non-tradable ethnic varieties. Besides, as love-of-variety (θ ) and migrants’   35
preference for ethnic variety (ε )  increase, migrants will shift consumption from native to 
ethnic varieties ( '/ 0 ε ε ∂∂ < and  '/ 0 ε ε ∂∂ < ). 
Using the budget constraint and (A.1.5) we can write the migrants’ demand for a single E and 
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Appendix II:  
 
Using (3), (4) and (6) into (1) and (9), 
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, we obtain: 
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Appendix III:  
 
Comparing equations (18) and (20) it is easy to check that 
* M  is always larger than 
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, utility in case 2 is always higher 
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  −  −   =+ − + =   
    
 −   =+ − + − >      
 (A.3.2) 
 
where the last term in square brackets is always positive (since 0' 1 ε < < ,  0 ε ∀> and 
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